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Abstract
This paper studies how to apply differential privacy
to constrained optimization problems whose inputs
are sensitive. This task raises significant challenges
since random perturbations of the input data often
render the constrained optimization problem infea-
sible or change significantly the nature of its opti-
mal solutions. To address this difficulty, this paper
proposes a bilevel optimization model that can be
used as a post-processing step: It redistributes the
noise introduced by a differentially private mecha-
nism optimally while restoring feasibility and near-
optimality. The paper shows that, under a natural
assumption, this bilevel model can be solved effi-
ciently for real-life large-scale nonlinear noncon-
vex optimization problems with sensitive customer
data. The experimental results demonstrate the ac-
curacy of the privacy-preserving mechanism and
showcase significant benefits compared to standard
approaches.
1 Introduction
Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006] is a robust
framework used to measure and bound the privacy risks in
computations over datasets: It has been successfully applied
to numerous applications including histogram queries [Li et
al., 2010], census surveys [Abowd, 2018; Fioretto and Van
Hentenryck, 2019], linear regression [Chaudhuri et al., 2011]
and deep learning [Abadi et al., 2016] to name but a few ex-
amples. In general, DP mechanisms ensure privacy by in-
troducing calibrated noise to the outputs or the objective of
computations. However, its applications to large-scale, com-
plex constrained optimization problems have been sparse.
This paper considers parametric optimization problems of
the form
Opdq “ min
x
fpxq s.t. gpx, dq ě 0, x ě 0. (OPT)
where x is a vector of decision variables and d is an input
vector. Given a vector do of sensitive data, the task is to
find a differentially private vector d˚ such that d˚ « do and
Opd˚q « Opdoq. Effective solutions to this task are useful in
various settings, including the generation of differentially pri-
vate test cases for (OPT) or in sequential coordination prob-
lems, e.g. sequential markets, in which agents need to ex-
change private versions of their data to solve O. It is possi-
ble to use traditional differential privacy techniques (e.g., the
ubiquitous Laplace or the Eponential mechanisms) to obtain
a private vector d˜ such that d˜ « do. However, in general, the
optimization problem (OPT) may not admit any feasible so-
lution for input d˜ or, its objective value Opd˜q can be far from
Opdoq. See for instance [Mak et al., 2019b] for an illustration
of this challenge on Optimal Power Flow (OPF) instances.
This paper aims at remedying this fundamental limitation.
Given private versions d˜ of do and f˜ of Opdoq, it proposes a
bilevel optimization model that leverages the post-processing
immunity of differential privacy to produce a new private vec-
tor d˚, based on d˜, such thatOpd˚q « Opdoq. The paper also
presents an algorithm that solves the bilevel model optimally
under a natural monotonicity assumption. The effectiveness
of the approach is demonstrated on large-scale case studies in
electrical and gas networks where customer demands are sen-
sitive, including nonlinear nonconvex benchmarks with more
than 104 variables. The paper generalizes prior approaches
designed to release benchmarks in energy systems (e.g., [Mak
et al., 2019b]). Its main contributions are as follows:
1. It proposes an algorithm that solves the bilevel opti-
mization model under a natural monotonicity assumption;
2. It demonstrates the effectiveness of the algorithm
through case studies: optimal power flow in power net-
work and compressor optimization in gas networks.
3. It empirically validates the monotonicity assumption on
these case studies.
4. It demonstrates that optimal solutions to the bilevel
model may produce significant improvements in accuracy
compared to its relaxations.
2 Preliminaries
The traditional definition of differential privacy [Dwork et al.,
2006] aims at protecting the potential participation of an indi-
vidual in a computation. For optimization problems however,
the participants are typically known and the input is a vector
d “ xd1, . . . , dmy, where di represents a sensitive quantity
associated with participant i. For instance, di may represent
the energy consumption of an industrial customer in an elec-
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trical transmission system. This privacy notion is best cap-
tured by the α-indistinguishability framework proposed by
Chatzikokolakis et al. [2013] which protects the sensitive data
of each individual up to some measurable quantity α ą 0. As
a result, this paper uses an adjacency relation „α for input
vectors defined as follows:
d „α d1 ô Di s.t. |di ´ d1i| ď α ^ dj “ d1j ,@j ‰ i,
where d and d1 are input vectors to (OPT) and α ą 0 is a
positive real value. This adjacency relation is to protect an
individual value di up to privacy level α even if an attacker
acquires information about all other inputs dj (j ‰ i).
Definition1 (Differential Privacy) Let α ą 0. A random-
ized mechanism M : D Ñ R with domain D and range R
is (, α)-differential indistinguishable if, for any output re-
sponse O Ď R and any two adjacent input vectors d and
d1 such that d „α d1,
PrrMpdq P Os ď ePrrMpd1q P Os.
Parameter  ě 0 controls the level of privacy, with small
values denoting strong privacy, while α controls the level of
indistinguishability. For notational simplicity, this paper as-
sumes that  is fixed to a constant and refers to mechanisms
satisfying the definition above as α-indistinguishable.
The post-processing immunity of DP [Dwork and Roth,
2013] guarantees that a private dataset remains private even
when subjected to arbitrary subsequent computations.
Theorem1 (Post-Processing Immunity) Let M be an α-
indistinguishable mechanism and g be a data-independent
mapping from the set of possible output sequences to an ar-
bitrary set. Then, g ˝M is α-indistinguishable.
A real function f over a vector d can be made indistin-
guishable by injecting carefully calibrated noise to its output.
The amount of noise to inject depends on the sensitivity ∆f of
f defined as ∆f “ maxd„αd1 }fpdq ´ fpd1q}1 . For instance,
querying a customer load from a dataset d corresponds to an
identity query whose sensitivity is α. The Laplace mech-
anism achieves α-indistinguishability by returning the ran-
domized output fpdq ` z, where z is drawn from the Laplace
distribution Lap p∆f {q [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013].
3 Differentially Private Optimization
3.1 Problem Definition
Consider the parametric optimization problem (OPT), a sen-
sitive vector do, anα-indistinguishable version d˜ of do, and an
approximation f˜ ofOpdoq. For instance, d˜ can be obtained by
applying the Laplace mechanism on identity queries on all di;
f˜ can be a private version of Opdoq, or the value Opdoq itself
if it is public (which is typically case when the optimization is
a market-clearing mechanism), or an approximation ofOpdoq
obtained using public information only (e.g., a public forecast
of do). The paper simply assumes that |Opdoq ´ f˜ | ď βo for
some value βo ą 0, which is not restrictive: This assump-
tion obviously holds when fo is public and it can always be
achieved by choosing large enough βo . The goal is to find a
vector d˚ using only d˜, f˜ , and the definition of (OPT) such
that
d˚ « d˜ and Opd˚q « f˜ .
Observe that, by Theorem 1, d˚ will be α-indistinguishable.
It will be close to do if d˜ is close to do. Moreover, (OPT)
is feasible for d˚ and Opd˚q will be close to Opdoq if f˜ is.
The paper uses Spdq to denote the set of optimal solutions to
(OPT), i.e.,
Spdq “ argmin
x
fpxq s.t. gpx, dq ě 0, x ě 0,
and Fpdq to denote the set of feasible solutions, i.e.,
Fpdq “ tx | gpx, dq ě 0, x ě 0u.
The paper assumes that Fpdoq is not empty.
3.2 The Bilevel Optimization Model
The problem defined in Section 3.1 can be tackled by a bilevel
optimization model (BL), i.e.,
d˚ “ argmin
d
}d´ d˜}22 (BL1)
s.t. |Opdq ´ f˜ | ď β. (BL2)
Its output is a private d˚ whose L2-distance to d˜ is minimized
and whose value Opd˚q is in the interval rf˜ ´ β, f˜ ` βs for a
parameter β ě βo. To make the bilevel nature more explicit,
the above can be reformulated as
min
d,x˚
}d´ d˜}22 (BL1’)
s.t. |fpx˚q ´ f˜ | ď β (BL2’)
x˚ “ argmin
xě0
fpxq s.t. gpx, dq ě 0. (Follower)
Note that do is a feasible solution to (BL), but not necessarily
optimal. The set of optimal solutions to (BL) is denoted by
SBL and the set of feasible solutions by FBL.
Theorem2 d˚ P SBL implies }d˚ ´ do}2 ď 2}d˜´ do}2.
Theorem 2 generalizes a prior result from [Fioretto and
Van Hentenryck, 2018]. It implies that, when a Laplace
mechanism produces d˜, a solution d˚ P SBL is no more
than a factor of 2 away from optimality since the Laplace
mechanism is optimal for identity queries [Koufogiannis et
al., 2015]. In other words, (BL) restores feasibility and near-
optimality at a constant cost in accuracy. In practice, as
shown in Section 5, d˚ is typically closer to do than d˜ is.
Bilevel optimization is computationally challenging. It is
strongly NP-hard [Hansen et al., 1992] and even determining
the optimality of a solution [Vicente et al., 1994] is NP-hard.
The High Point Relaxation (HPR), defined as
dh “ argmin
d,xě0
}d´ d˜}22 (HPR1)
s.t. gpx, dq ě 0 (HPR2)
|fpxq ´ f˜ | ď β (HPR3)
is an important tool in bilevel optimization and Opdhq ď
Opd˚q. Theorem 2 also holds for (HPR), i.e., }dh ´ do}2 ď
2}d˜´ do}2. The set of optimal solutions to (HPR) is denoted
by SHPR and its set of feasible solutions by FHPR. For sim-
plicity, pd, xq P SP and d P SP are both used to denote an
optimal solution to a problem (P) and its projection to d.
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Figure 1: Illustrating the Intuition Underlying OÒ.
3.3 Solving the Bilevel Model
While bilevel optimization is, in general, computationally
challenging, Model (BL) presents a substantial structure:
(Follower) minimizes f but (BL2) restrains it to be in a tight
interval and (BL1) keeps the potential solution close to d˜. The
proposed solution technique leverages these observations and
an additional insight derived from practical applications.
Intuition Consider a pair pd¯, x¯q such that x¯ ě 0, gpx¯, d¯q ě
0), and |fpx¯q ´ f˜ | ď β. Note that x¯ is not necessarily a so-
lution (i.e., a minimizer) to Problem (Follower). However, if
the optimal objective value Opd¯q is such that Opd¯q ě f˜ ´ β,
then d¯ P FBL. The interesting case is when Opd¯q ă f˜ ´ β.
The proposed solution method recognizes that, in many op-
timization problems with sensitive data, d¯i represents some
data about participant i, such as her electricity consumption.
Assume, for instance, that d¯ represents the customer demands
(the reasoning is similar if the data represents prices and re-
versed if the data represents production capabilities). By in-
creasing d¯i, the valueOpd¯q is expected to rise as well. The so-
lution technique exploits this insight: It tries to find solutions
that maximize the customer demands while staying within a
small distance of d˜. In so doing, it restricts attention to input
vectors in the set N defined as
N “ td | Dx ě 0 : gpx, dq ě 0 and |fpxq ´ f˜} ď βu.
Solution Method This section presents an effective algo-
rithm for solving the bilevel optimization problem (BL) when
(OPT) is monotone with respect to the sensitive data, captur-
ing the above intuition.
Definition2 (Monotonicity) (OPT) is monotone if there ex-
ists a function m : <m Ñ < such that if, for all d1, d2 P N ,
mpd1q ě mpd2q ñ Opd1q ě Opd2q.
Note that the monotonicity assumption applies only to in-
put vectors in N . Computational results will show that this
monotonicity property holds on real and realistic benchmarks
in energy systems. To solve bilevel optimization problems
over a monotone follower, the approach relies on solving op-
timization problems of the form
OÒpδq “ max
d,xě0 mpdq (PP1)
subject to gpx, dq ě 0 (PP2)
|fpxq ´ f˜ | ď β (PP3)
}d´ d˜}22 ď δ (PP4)
Algorithm 1: Solving the BLM Optimization Problem.
Inputs : xδl, δu, ηy
Output: An η-approximation to (BL)
1 while δu ´ δl ą η do
2 δ Ð δl`δu2
3 solve OÒpδq and let pdÒ, xÒq be an optimal solution
4 δÒ Ð }dÒ ´ d˜}
5 if OpdÒq ą f˜ ´ β then δu Ð δÒ else δl Ð δ ;
6 return SÒpδuq
The set of optimal and feasible solutions toOÒpδq are denoted
by SÒpδq and FÒpδq respectively. For a given δ, OÒpδq finds
a vector d¯ P N that maximizes mp¨q but remains within a
distance δ of d˜ . Since, by monotonicity, mp¨q is a proxy for
maximizing Op¨q, the optimization can be viewed as search-
ing for a feasible solution of (BL) within a distance δ of d˜
which maximizes Op¨q. Figure 1 illustrates the role of OÒ.
Vector di P N is the optimal solution of OÒpδiq. As the dis-
tance δi increases, di “ OÒpδiq and Opdiq increase as well.
Under the monotonicity assumption, (BL) will be shown
equivalent to the following optimization problem:
min
d,δě0 δ s.t. d P S
Òpδq ^ Opdq ě f˜ ´ β (BLM)
which is defined only in terms of O and OÒ. Observe that δ
is a scalar and hence it is natural to solve (BLM) using binary
search as depicted in Algorithm (1). The algorithm receives
as input a tuple xδl, δu, ηy, where δl and δu are lower and up-
per bounds on the optimal value δ˚ for (BLM), and produces
an η-approximation to (BLM). Algorithm (1) is a simple bi-
nary search on the value δ alternating the optimizations of
O and OÒ. For a given δ, line 3 solves OÒ. If the resulting
optimization satisfies the second constraint of (BLM), a new
feasible solution to (BL) is obtained and the upper bound can
be updated. Otherwise, Algorithm (1) has identified a new
lower bound. Note that, in practice, good lower and upper
bounds are often available. For instance, it is possible to use
an optimal solution dh of (HPR) and set δl “ δh “ }dh´d˜}22.
To obtain δu, one can start with δh and continue by doubling
its value iteratively until Lemma 1 below applies.
Correctness It remains to prove the correctness of the solu-
tion technique. The following two lemmas capture important
properties ofOÒ. The first lemma shows that, when δ is large
enough, OÒpδq always returns a feasible solution to (BL).
Lemma1 Let δo “ }do ´ d˜}22 ď δo and pdÒ, xÒq P SÒpδoq.
Then dÒ P FBL.
Proof. By definition of δo, do P FÒpδoq and there exists xo
such that the pair pdo, xoq satisfies conditions (PP2)–(PP4).
Since pdÒ, xÒq P SÒpδoq, mpdÒq ě mpdoq and, by mono-
tonicity,OpdÒq ě Opdoq ě f˜´β. By (PP3), fpxÒq ď fo`β
and, by (PP2), OpdÒq ď fpxÒq. Hence
f˜ ` β ě fpxÒq ě OpdÒq ě Opdoq ě f˜ ´ β
and dÒ satisfies (BL2). l
Model 1 OOPF: AC Optimal Power Flow
variables: Sgi , Vi @i P N, Sij @pi, jq P E Y ER
minimize: OpSdq “ ÿ
iPN
c2ip<pSgi qq2 ` c1i<pSgi q ` c0i (3)
subject to: =Vi “ 0, i P N (4)
v
l
i ď |Vi| ď vui @i P N (5)
θ
l
ij ď =pViV ˚j q ď θuij @pi, jq P E (6)
S
gl
i ď Sgi ď Sgui @i P N (7)
|Sij | ď suij @pi, jq P E Y ER (8)
S
g
i ´ Sdi “
ř
pi,jqPEYER Sij @i P N (9)
Sij “ Y ˚ij |Vi|2 ´ Y ˚ij ViV ˚j @pi, jq P E Y ER (10)
The second lemma shows that there is no feasible solution
to (BL) within distance 9δ of d˜ whenOp 9δq returns a solution d
that violates (BL2).
Lemma2 Let p 9d, 9xq P SÒp 9δq and Op 9dq ă f˜ ´ β. Then,
@df P FBL : }df ´ d˜}22 ą 9δ.
Proof. Consider df P FBL and assume that }df ´ d˜}22 ď 9δ,
which implies that df P FÒp 9δq. By optimality of 9d, mp 9dq ě
mpdf q and, by monotonicity, Op 9dq ě Opdf q. By (BL2),
Opdf q ě f˜ ´ β which contradicts Op 9dq ă f˜ ´ β. l
These two lemmas make it possible to prove the equiva-
lence of (BL) and (BLM) when (OPT) is monotone.
Theorem3 When (OPT) is monotone, (BL) and (BLM) are
equivalent.
Proof. Let pd˚, δ˚q be the optimal solution to (BLM). Such a
solution always exists by Lemma 1 and }d˚ ´ d˜}22 ď δ˚. By
definition of OÒ, Fpd˚q ‰ H and Opd˚q ď f˜ ` β. Since
Opd˚q ě f˜ ´ β by definition of (BLM), d˚ P FBL.
Consider now δ´ ă δ˚ and a solution d´ P SÒpδ´q. If
such a solution exists, Opd´q ă fo ´ β by optimality of δ˚.
By Lemma 2, it comes that @df P FBL : }df ´ d˜}22 ą δ´.
Hence, d˚ is also optimal for (BL). l
It remains to show that the algorithm computes an η-
approximation.
Theorem4 Algorithm (1) computes an η-approximation of
(BL) when (OPT) is monotone.
Proof. Let d˚ be an optimal solution to (BL). Upon termina-
tion of Algorithm (1), it comes that δl ď }d˚ ´ d˜}22 ď δu.
Moreover, if du P SÒpδuq, it follows that }du ´ d˜}22 ď δu.
Hence, δl ď }d˚ ´ d˜}22 ď }du ´ d˜}22 ď δu. l
4 Applications on Energy Systems
This section describes two substantial case studies for eval-
uating the privacy mechanism: optimal power flow in elec-
tricity networks and optimal compressor optimization in gas
networks. Both models are nonlinear and nonconvex.
Model 2 OOGF: Optimal Gas Flow
variables: pi, qi @i P J , qij @pi, jq P P, Rij @pi, jq P C
minimize: Opqq “ ÿ
pi,jqPC
µ
´1|qij |pmaxtRij , 1u2pγ´1q{γ ´ 1q (11)
subject to:
ř
pi,jqPP qij ´
ř
pj,iqPP qji “ qi, @i P J (12)
pi
l ď pi ď piu @i P N, qij l ď qij ď qiju @pi, jq P P (13)
Rij
l ď Rij ď Riju @pi, jq P C (14)
pi “ pTi @i P JB , qi “ 0 @i P J T , qi “ qdi i P JD (15)
R
2
ijp
2
i ´ p2j “ Lij
λa2
DijA2ij
qij |qij | @pi, jq P C (16)
p
2
i ´ p2j “ Lij
λa2
DijA2ij
qij |qij | @pi, jq P P ´ C (17)
Optimal Power Flow Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is the
problem of finding the best generator dispatch to meet the
demands in a power network. A power network N can be
represented as a graph pN,Eq, where the nodes in N rep-
resent buses and the edges in E represent lines. The edges
in E are directed and ER is used to denote those arcs in E
but in reverse direction. The AC power flow equations are
based on complex quantities for current I , voltage V , admit-
tance Y , and power S, and these equations are a core building
block in many power system applications. Model 1 shows the
AC OPF formulation, with variables/quantities shown in the
complex domain. Superscripts u and l are used to indicate
upper and lower bounds for variables. The objective function
OpSgq captures the cost of the generator dispatch, with Sg
denoting the vector of generator dispatch values pSgi | i P Nq.
Constraint (4) sets the reference angle to zero for the slack
bus i P N to eliminate numerical symmetries. Constraints
(5) and (6) capture the voltage and phase angle difference
bounds. Constraints (7) and (8) enforce the generator output
and line flow limits. Finally, Constraints (9) capture Kirch-
hoff’s Current Law and Constraints (10) capture Ohm’s Law.
Optimal Compressor Optimization Optimal Gas Flow
(OGF) is the problem of finding the best compression control
to maintain pressure requirements in a natural gas pipeline
system. A natural gas network can be represented as a di-
rected graph N “ pJ ,Pq, where a node i P J represents
a junction point and an arc represents a pipeline pi, jq P P
represent the edges. Compressors (C Ď P) are installed in
a subset of the pipelines for boosting the gas pressure p in
order to maintain pressure requirements for gas flow q. The
set JD of gas demands and the set J T of transporting nodes
are modeled as junction points, with net gas flow qi set to the
gas demand (qdi ) and zero respectively. For simplicity, the pa-
per assumes no pressure regulation and losses within junction
nodes and gas flow/flux are conserved throughout the system.
A subset J B P J of the nodes are regulated with constant
pressure pTi . The length of pipe pi, jq is denoted by Lij , its
diameter by Dij , and its cross-sectional area by Aij . Uni-
versal quantities include isentropic coefficient γ, compressor
efficiency factor µ, sound speed a, and gas friction factor λ.
Model 2 depicts the OGF formulation. The objective function
Opqq captures the compressor costs using the compressor
control values pRij | pi, jq P Cq. Constraints (12) capture the
flow conversation equations. Constraints (13) and (14) cap-
ture the pressure, flux flow, and compressor control bounds.
Constraints (15) set the boundary conditions for the demands
and the regulated pressures. Finally, Constraints (16) and (17)
capture the steady-state isothermal gas flow equation.
Obfuscation In both networks, customer demands are sen-
sitive and are associated with customer activities. These
quantities always appear in the flow conservation constraints,
which are linear. Increasing these values obviously requires
more (electricity and gas) production and hence one can ex-
pect the cost to increase. This is not always the case, because
of the engineering constraints on voltages and pressures and
the lower bounds of the production units, for instance. How-
ever, in practice, because of reliability constraints, these con-
straints are rarely binding at optimality and one may expect
the systems to behave monotonically around the optimality
point. The above is validated in the experimental results.
5 Experimental Evaluation
Setting The experiments were performed on a variety of
NESTA power systems [Coffrin et al., 2014] and natural gas
test systems from [Mak et al., 2019a], including test instances
from GasLib [Pfetsch et al., 2015]. Parameter  is fixed to 1.0
and the indistinguishability level α varies from 10´1 to 101
(in per unit notation). The fidelity parameter β varies from
0.1% to 10% of value f˜ “ fo. Convergence parameter η is
set to 10´3 (in per unit). The lower bounds and upper bounds
are initialized as specified in prior sections. The solution tech-
nique is limited to 3000 calls to OÒ. The models are imple-
mented with PowerModels.jl [Coffrin et al., 2018] with the
nonlinear solver IPOPT [Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006]. Note
that some of the test cases have more than 104 variables.
Behavior of the Solution Technique Figure 2 shows how
the costs (O and OÒ) and L2-Distance to δ˜ typically change
when running Algorithm 1 and its initialization. The L2-
Distance to d˜ increases initially to find a solution within the
feasible cost range (shaded area). The binary search then
finds the optimal distance in a few iterations. (PP4) is usu-
ally binding when optimizing OÒ.
Convergence and Computational Efficiency The experi-
mental results demonstrate the robustness and scalability of
the approach. Tables 1 and 2 depict the average CPU times
(in seconds) and average number of calls to OÒ (and thus O)
also over 50 runs. All instances (except one1) converge with
a very small number of iterations. Even large-scale test cases
with more than 104 variables are solved in a few iterations.
The bilevel model is thus a truly practical approach to de-
mand obfuscation of these networks.
Monotonicity Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the interpolation of
the optimal values OÒ (y-axis) with the respect to their dis-
tances to δ˜ (x-axis) obtained while solving the bilevel model.
The shaded area shows the feasible cost range. The results
summarize 50 runs (each with a different random seed), each
1The failure to converge on IEEE-73 (marked with a superscript)
is due to a poor starting point from the HPR.
α 0.1 1.0 10.0 0.1 1.0 10.0
Benchmark Time (s) Time (s) Time (s) Opt. Opt. Opt.
case14 ieee 0.71 0.58 1.01 10.22 4.40 6.10
case24 ieee rts 1.52 1.40 2.30 8.90 4.14 5.10
case29 edin 0.67 36.84 23.50 1.00 40.36 27.78
case30 as 0.90 0.90 0.85 4.62 4.28 3.80
case30 fsr 1.28 1.07 0.66 6.24 4.70 2.82
case30 ieee 0.84 1.22 1.33 5.14 5.86 6.06
case39 epri 1.16 6.92 1.29 6.32 21.50 3.14
case57 ieee 1.77 4.22 10.31 4.98 3.72 7.94
case73 ieee rts 6.20 2.17 11.571 9.88 1.62 66.54
case89 pegase 9.23 13.56 17.60 6.04 5.26 7.82
case118 ieee 10.15 10.71 9.77 10.08 5.96 6.42
case162 ieee dtc 10.04 35.18 53.72 4.88 9.68 8.82
case189 edin 2.98 53.40 58.08 2.16 7.98 8.18
case240 wecc 12.34 117.78 148.16 1.16 10.88 10.10
case300 ieee 1621.78 360.99 301.32 8.90 7.98 10.32
case1354 pegase 15.90 2172.23 2363.19 1.16 7.68 9.10
case1394sop eir 70.78 777.66 1427.87 3.72 6.12 5.40
case1397sp eir 146.47 1298.15 660.12 3.90 6.40 4.60
case1460wp eir 157.06 1418.58 728.84 4.72 6.90 5.66
Table 1: OPF: Average CPU times and number of optimizations (50
runs) for parameters α “ t0.1, 1.0, 10.0u and β “ 1%.
α 0.1 1.0 2.0 0.1 1.0 2.0
Benchmark Time (s) Time (s) Time (s) Opt. Opt. Opt.
24-pipe 2.34 0.67 1.77 20.56 6.20 6.22
GasLib-40 34.74 141.16 132.65 26.50 33.48 28.82
GasLib-135 21.63 28.91 214.57 12.96 8.74 25.80
Table 2: OGF: Average CPU times and number of optimizations (50
runs) for parameters α “ t0.1, 1.0, 2.0u and β “ 1%.
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Figure 2: Gaslib-135: OGF costs and L2-distance to δ˜ as a function
of the number of iterations for parameters α “ 0.1 and β “ 1%.
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Figure 3: IEEE-39 (left) IEEE-118 (right): OPF cost as a function
of the L2-distance to δ˜ for parameters α “ 0.1 and β “ 1%.
represented by a colored curve. As can be seen, the mono-
tonicity property holds in these real networks. Note also the
single points in the gas plot: These are cases where the high-
point relaxation can be made optimal in one iteration.
The Benefits of the Bilevel Model Tables 3 and 4 show
the benefits of the bilevel model compared to the HPR. The
HPR returns a solution dh in N with the smallest distance
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Figure 4: 24-pipe (left) Gaslib-40 (right): OGF cost as a function of
the L2-distance to δ˜ for parameters α “ 0.1 and β “ 10%.
Bi-level High-point
βp%q 10% 1% 0.1% 10% 1% 0.1%
case14 ieee 0.1 0.1 0.0 -4.9 -6.2 -6.3
case24 ieee rts 0.0 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -1.6 -1.9
case29 edin -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1
case30 as 0.7 0.3 -0.1 -1.1 -2.3 -2.4
case30 fsr -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -6.2 -6.8 -6.9
case30 ieee -0.3 0.1 0.0 -2.7 -1.8 -1.6
case39 epri -0.2 -0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7
case57 ieee 1.5 0.4 0.1 1.4 -0.6 -1.0
case73 ieee rts -0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.4 -1.1 -1.4
case89 pegase -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6
case118 ieee -0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.0 -1.6 -2.0
case162 ieee dtc 2.6 0.5 0.1 2.3 -0.1 -0.7
case189 edin 9.2 1.0 0.1 9.2 0.8 -0.1
case240 wecc 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 -0.2
case300 ieee 8.9 0.9 0.1 8.8 0.9 0.1
case1354 pegase 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
case1394sop eir 9.8 1.0 0.1 10.3 1.2 0.3
case1397sp eir 10.0 1.0 0.1 10.5 2.0 0.7
case1460wp eir 9.8 1.0 0.1 14.6 1.5 0.7
Table 3: OPF test cases: Average OPF cost difference (in %) for
parameters α “ 0.1 and β “ t10%, 1%, 0.1%u.
Bi-level High-point
βp%q 10% 1% 0.1% 10% 1% 0.1%
24-pipe -3.1 -0.3 0.0 -12.1 -13.7 -14.1
gaslib-40 2.5 0.3 0.0 -31.5 -38.1 -39.0
gaslib-135 1.3 0.2 0.0 -37.3 -38.4 -41.6
Table 4: OGF test cases: Average OGF cost differences (in %) for
parameters α “ 0.1 and β “ t10%, 1%, 0.1%u.
to d˜. However, it is typically the case that Opdhq ă f˜ ´ β.
The tables report the relative distance of Opd˚q and Opdhq
to f0 for various values of β. Table 4 shows that, on the
gas networks, the bilevel model produces several orders of
magnitude improvements over the HPR. The gains are less
pronounced on the electricity systems, but remain substantial.
Notice that a few percents in the energy sector correspond to
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Obfuscation Quality Tables 5 and 6 report the L2-
distances to the original loads for the high-point relaxation,
the bilevel model, and the load vector d˜ (which typically pro-
duces infeasible problems). The results are averaged over 50
runs. The results show that the fidelity of the bilevel model
(i.e., how close d˚ is to do) is extremely high, and often im-
proves over the fidelity of the HPR. Finally, the bilevel model
has a much higher fidelity than the Laplace mechanism.
Bi-level High-point Laplace
α (p.u.) 0.1 1.0 10.0 0.1 1.0 10.0 0.1 1.0 10.0
case14 ieee 0.67 4.48 10.32 0.67 4.51 10.60 0.71 7.08 70.82
case24 ieee rts 0.13 1.11 3.61 0.13 1.11 3.63 0.13 1.34 13.39
case29 edin 0.01 0.09 0.82 0.01 0.09 0.82 0.01 0.09 0.87
case30 as 0.84 3.34 4.45 0.84 3.35 4.49 0.97 9.74 97.43
case30 fsr 1.42 5.47 7.40 1.43 5.49 7.47 1.66 16.61 166.14
case30 ieee 0.88 3.86 5.46 0.88 3.88 5.60 0.97 9.74 97.43
case39 epri 0.06 0.60 2.44 0.06 0.60 2.44 0.06 0.62 6.24
case57 ieee 0.34 2.38 6.64 0.34 2.42 7.56 0.35 3.51 35.14
case73 ieee rts 0.13 1.11 3.65 0.13 1.11 3.67 0.13 1.32 13.19
case89 pegase 0.06 0.53 2.64 0.06 0.53 2.86 0.06 0.56 5.60
case118 ieee 0.40 3.03 6.85 0.40 3.04 6.87 0.40 3.99 39.89
case162 ieee dtc 0.09 0.68 1.59 0.10 0.69 1.61 0.10 0.96 9.62
case189 edin 0.34 2.05 3.92 0.34 2.07 4.18 0.35 3.50 35.05
case240 wecc 0.01 0.12 0.99 0.01 0.12 1.01 0.01 0.12 1.23
case300 ieee 0.10 0.85 3.69 0.10 0.86 4.46 0.11 1.07 10.65
case1354 pegase 0.14 1.26 5.47 0.14 1.26 6.21 0.14 1.36 13.59
Table 5: OPF test cases: Average distance (L2, normalized to origi-
nal scale) between obfuscated and original solutions for parameters
α “ t0.1, 1.0, 10.0u and β “ 1%.
Bi-level High-point Laplace
α (p.u.) 0.1 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.0
24-pipe 0.32 1.24 2.68 0.34 1.29 2.71 0.36 1.43 3.58
gaslib-40 2.04 7.66 22.13 1.95 7.51 16.54 2.01 8.03 20.07
gaslib-135 0.72 2.78 7.30 0.72 2.75 6.46 0.72 2.88 7.19
Table 6: OGF test cases: Average distance (L2, normalized to origi-
nal scale) between obfuscated and original solutions for parameters
α “ t0.1, 0.4, 1.0u and β “ 1%.
6 Related Work
This paper generalizes the results from [Mak et al., 2019b]
on power systems to a broader context: It presents them in
a general setting, formalizes the monotonicity property, and
proves the optimality of the algorithm under the monotonic-
ity assumption. It also presents novel experimental results
on gas networks and empirical evidence for the monotonic-
ity assumption. The HPR was proposed as a post-processing
step for power systems in [Fioretto et al., 2018]. Zhou et
al. [2019] presents a particularly interesting relaxed notion
of a (stronger) monotonicity property for a DC-OPF operator
and shows how to use it to compute the operator sensitivity.
Finally, Karapetyan et al. [2017] quantifies empirically the
trade-off between privacy and utility in demand response sys-
tems: They analyzed the effects of the Laplace mechanism.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented a bilevel optimization model for post-
processing the differentially private input of a constrained
optimization problem. The model restores the feasibility
and near-optimality of the optimization problem. The paper
shows that the bilevel model can be solved effectively under
a natural monotonicity assumption by alternating the solving
of the follower problem and the solving of a novel optimiza-
tion model that maximizing a proxy of the true objective. Ex-
perimental results on large-scale nonconvex constrained opti-
mization problems with more than 104 variables demonstrate
the accuracy, efficiency, and benefits of the approach. They
also validate the monotonicity assumptions empirically. Fu-
ture work will be devoted to understanding and characterizing
theoretically the solution space around optimal solutions.
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